The 2007 Alberta potato cyst nematode discovery that cost the provincial industry dearly was a case study in a flawed federal plant disease management system, says an internal government assessment.
In 2009, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency prepared a case study in how the Canadian system responded to the limited nematode incident, and it found serious problems.
“The PCN experience can be used as a model to demonstrate the need to link plant health issues into larger strategic initiatives and provide information as input into the development of a more robust and proactive plant health/bio-security system,” said a draft of the analysis later sent to senior government offices.
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The analysis, in draft form, was obtained by Ottawa-based access to information specialist Ken Rubin. He said the analysis of system flaws was sent last year to the Privy Council Office, the prime minister’s bureaucratic nerve centre.
The CFIA analysis noted that when potato cyst nematode was discovered on two Alberta farms in late 2007, the U.S. border slammed shut, a government-industry committee was formed and eventually the border was reopened after CFIA agreed to collect and test more than 46,000 soil samples beginning in 2008 and as long as no other PCN incidents were found.
But along the way, problems were discovered, according to the CFIA analysis. Included were potato industry complaints that when negotiating with the Americans, they were at a disadvantage because U.S. producers knew more from their government than Canadian farmers knew from theirs.
It affected both negotiation of the original PCN protocol and the border- closing crisis that developed in late 2008.
As well, the analysis was highly critical of the way the agency and the Canadian farm business risk management programs responded to the potato border closing.
“The current structure tends to be ad hoc when serious outbreaks occur and immediate responses place challenges on CFIA resources and plant health specific funds,” said the internal report.
“BRM covers a portion of costs associated with eligible producers. Responses are ad hoc, sector specific and incorporates reactive action only.”
The report said BRM programs “can be slow to respond and apply to the entire industry, including regulatory non-compliant producers.”
And it concluded farmers can be the losers because of the policy failure.
“The structure can significantly impact the bottom line for the industry as a whole as it ultimately increases the cost of production for producers,” said the document.
It also argued that because government compensation for producers who report disease problems is so unpredictable and low, it discourages farmers from reporting problems or suspicions.
“Lack of effective, long-term compensation affects compliance and increases uncertainty,” said the analysis.
It said other countries, such as Australia and Norway, have developed better systems for dealing with plant disease outbreaks and their international implications.
It recommended that Canada increase its traceability system to improve the ability to satisfy foreign markets that any disease detection is contained.
