There are growing indications that agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organization have reached an impasse, threatening the entire Doha round of talks.
“If we don’t see some progress soon, some compromise, I’m afraid the whole thing could collapse,” warned Patty Townsend of the Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance. “We need a deal.”
Agriculture minister Lyle Vanclief fueled the sense of growing crisis by suggesting Canada would walk away from a WTO deal it does not like.
“No deal is better than a bad deal,” he said in a March 20 interview.
Read Also

Canola support gets mixed response
A series of canola industry support measures announced by the federal government are being met with mixed reviews.
A September 2003 meeting of trade and agriculture ministers in Mexico was supposed to be a stage to affirm progress in the negotiations. Without an agricultural deal, it could instead become a forum for disagreement and collapse.
Last week, WTO agriculture negotiating committee chair Stuart Harbinson issued a second set of proposals that immediately were denounced by governments, including Canada.
The outlines of an agricultural deal were supposed to emerge by March 31, but this week’s last-ditch negotiation in Geneva almost certainly will end in deadlock.
Vanclief said the Harbinson text is a sign of how far apart and rigid the bargaining positions remain after three years of negotiation.
“It tells us very clearly that no country is prepared to move from their initial position,” he said.
“All of the countries have said very clearly the success of the Doha round will hinge on agriculture. So far, there has been no progress.”
Trade minister Pierre Pettigrew said agriculture remains “the cornerstone of the overall negotiations.”
Vanclief vowed that like other countries, Canada will not move from its initial bargaining position.
It calls for the end of export subsidies, sharp cuts in trade-distorting subsidies and cuts in protective tariffs, except those that protect such trade-sensitive industries as supply management. Canada also insists on the right to operate state trading enterprises such as the Canadian Wheat Board.
“We’ve made it clear Canada is not going to (move),” he said. “We’re very strong on our initial negotiating position and we’re not going to budge off of that.”
Harbinson has been trying to lure negotiators into starting serious negotiations by proposing a text that would phase out export subsidies, gradually reduce tariffs and sharply trim domestic subsidies. The wheat board would have to give up its monopoly and supply management boards would see both tariff cuts and an almost doubling of the domestic market share available to imports.
Vanclief immediately said Canada would continue to oppose “the (Harbinson) approach on market access, state-trading enterprises and the lack of ambition in reducing trade-distorting subsidies.”
Some farm groups urged Canada to dismiss the Harbinson text and insist on a new approach to trade rules.
“If this text is used as the basis for negotiations, then some of it will make it into the final text and these ideas just are not acceptable,” said Canadian Federation of Agriculture president Bob Friesen.
The CFA called on Ottawa to reject the proposal “in its entirety.”
Canada’s supply managed sectors called on the government to “change its strategy” and seek allies to push for trade rules that “ensure reasonable returns to farmers.”
CAFTA said the Harbinson proposals are too timid and “disappointing,” but should not be totally rejected.
“If Canada were to reject the Harbinson text, it would not only be risking isolation in international trade negotiations, but by delaying or completely stalling negotiations, Canada would be jeopardizing the well-being of the trade reliant sector of the Canadian agriculture and food economy,” the group said in a March 20 letter to cabinet ministers.
While the text is “not perfect, it is a good solid foundation upon which to begin negotiations.”
Townsend said if talks collapse or the Cancun meeting turns into a fiasco, there is a danger the United States and the European Union will repeat 1993, when the two trade superpowers made a deal and told other countries they could take it or have no deal at all.
The result was what many have considered a flawed agreement that left most U.S. and EU subsidies and trade distorting practices in place.